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COMPUTER SOFTWARE
AND
UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION
by

JOSEPH SCAFETTA, JR.*

UNFAIR COMPETITION IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE

When the common law term "unfair competition" is bandied
around' in legal circles in discussions of wrongful actions by
others in the computer industry, the term itself is not appropriate because it traditionally refers only to the practice of attempting to pass off one's own goods, by imitation of general appearance, as the goods of a competitor who enjoys immediate favorable public recognition. 2 The phrase that should be used is the
more general term "unfair methods of competition" which is,
unfortunately, quite nebulous itself and, not unexpectedly, appears undefined in Federal Trade Commission Act section 5.4 Although not defined therein, this term has generally become
known to embrace any unfair trade practice which dishonestly
negates a competitor's opportunity for fair play in the marketplace, 5 such as false advertising, palming off, misappropriation
of trade secrets, etc.
Common law unfair competition and false advertising are exemplary of unfair methods of competition that either do not occur or are not special problems in the computer industry. However, because of the nature of software and the meager extent
of legal protection available to the industry, there is one unfair
* Associate, Colton & Stone, Inc., Arlington, Va.; Member, Court
of Customs & Patent Appeals Bar; Registered Attorney, U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office; Member, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Bar; M. Pat.
L., Georgetown University, 1973; J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1972;
B.S. Aero. E., Pennsylvania State University, 1969.
1. Baxendale, Index and Fourth Selected Bibliography on Computers and the Law, 2 RUTGERS J. COMPUTER & L. 248, 250 (1971); Baxendale, Index and Selected Bibliography on Computers and the Law, 1
RUTGERS J. COMPUTER & L. 102, 105 (1970); Galbi, Copyright and Unfair

Competition Law as Applied to the Protection of Computer Programming, 3 COMPUTER L. SERV. § 4-3, Article 1, at 20-28 (1972).
2. See Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S.

118, 140 (1905); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 184

(1896).
3. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 531-33 (1935).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970), as amended by Act of January 4,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 2193 provides: "Unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."
5. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930); FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 476 (1923).
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method of competition that stands out as a matter of deep and
anxious concern-misappropriation of trade secrets. This article
will attempt to explore why both present laws and software itself
have led to this problem, what are the major aspects of the problem, and, finally, what those in the industry can do to protect
themselves against its occurrence.
THE PREFERRED CHOICE OF LEGAL PROTECTION
FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE"

There are three routes by which one may protect intellectual
property. Usually, the most favored protection for property of
a utilitarian nature is patenting. However, this route has been
generally shunned by the computer industry because of the present uncertainty over the extent, if any, of protection available
for software. In Gottschalk v. Benson7 the Supreme Court
denied a patent on a process for use in programming a digital
computer but specifically refused to preclude a patent for all
programs servicing a computer.8 Later, in Dann v. Johnston9
the Supreme Court denied a patent on a computer-programmed
system for automatic record keeping on the grounds that the invention was obvious to one of reasonable skill in the data processing art. However, in so ruling the Court again deliberately
sidestepped the threshold issue of the general patentability of
computer programs. 10 Thus, the continuing refusal of the Supreme Court to decide the basic issue has resulted in a concomitant reluctance on the part of the computer industry to seek
patent protection.
The most favored route for protection of property of a written nature is usually copyrighting but this likewise has been
6. Software is a generic name for various inputs to computers.
"Systems" software is an input via machine-readable cards or magnetic
tape by which switches are set to wire the electronic circuits so they
function as may be required by any subsequent "applications" software. Applications software is a synonym in the trade for the more

commonly used term "program."

A program is a series of machine-

readable representations on a deck of cards or magnetic tape which
directs the operation of a general purpose digital computer through a

desired procedure or algorithm.
Software is also called "instant hardware" because, upon its input
into the general purpose digital computer, it causes the computer automatically to make circuit connections so that it may process electrical
signals in a way determined by the connections in the same manner
as if the circuits were hand-soldered. Because the general purpose
digital computer is simply an organized storeroom of electrical components waiting to be interconnected in any manner by the introduction
of software (see Guidelines, 829 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1 (1966)), the
valuable part of a digital computer lies in the instructions or "soldering

directions" of the software.
7. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
8. Id. at 71.

9. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
10. Id. at 220.
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generally shunned by the computer industry. The reason is twofold. First, a copyright provides protection only against a taking
by substantial copying of the expressed form in the written program. To find infringement, there must be some actual appropriation of language." A skilled programmer can easily avoid
infringement by restating any routine in analogous machinereadable language that would produce the identical end result
of the program sought to be appropriated. Second, a copyright
does not provide protection to the owner against another's use
3
of the concept, idea, or algorithm 12 embodied in the software.'
Also, there is a prerequisite of "publication" before a written program can be registered for a federal statutory copyright. 14 At
the point of publication, the contribution made by the concept,
idea, or algorithm passes into the public domain for free use by
everyone. Because the value of software to its owner lies in the
contribution of the concept, idea, or algorithm to the data processing art, copyright protection of only a particular written expression of a program is too narrow and totally inadequate in
the eyes of the computer industry.
Because of the uncertainty of the extent of protection available via the usually favored routes of patenting and copyrighting,
the preferred choice of legal protection for computer software
has been to maintain them as trade secrets. 15 Now that state
11. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
12. An algorithm is a prescribed set of well-defined rules or processes for the solution of a problem in a finite number of steps, e.g., a
full statement of an arithmetic procedure for an evaluation to a stated
degree of precision. See JOINT TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON TERMINOLOGY
OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL

FEDERATION

INTERNATIONAL COMPUTATION CENTRE,
TION PROCESSING 13 (1966).

FOR

INFORMATION

IFIP-ICC

PROCESSING

AND

VOCABULARY OF INFORMA-

13. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), as amended by Act of October 19, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (to be codified in 17 U.S.C. § 13) constituted a general revision of the copyright laws, to be effective on January 1, 1978. Publication is no longer a prerequisite of registration since
unpublished works may be registered. Section 104(a) of the amended
Act states that "works specified . . . , while unpublished, are entitled to
protection under this title . . ." However, registration is a prerequisite

to institution of an infringement suit and certain remedies available.
Section 411(a) of the amended Act states that "no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration
of the copyright claim has been made ......
Also, Section 412 of the
amended Act states that "no award of statutory damages or of attorney's
fees .

.

. shall be made for-(1) any infringement of copyright in an un-

published work commenced before the effective date of its registration
Although the objection of the computer industry to copyright
protection has been partially overcome by the removal of the publication
prerequisite, objection to copyrights remains because of the narrow scope
of protection to only particular written expressions of a work. Finally,
Section 102(b) of the amended Act states that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work."
15. For an in depth and sophisticated treatment of this subject, see
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laws for the protection of trade secrets have been recognized as
generally constitutional by the Supreme Court, 6 the trade secret
route has become the rule for the industry. Concomitantly, the
industry considers computer software programs to be clearly
7
trade secret subject matter.'
Another reason the trade secret route is preferred over patenting and copyrighting is that, unlike the statutorily limited
terms for patents 8 and copyrights, 9 state protection for trade
secrets lasts as long as the software program is kept secret, which
conceivably may be forever. Secrecy, an essential element, 20
must be proven in order to establish a trade secret. Indeed, the
value of a trade secret resides in its secrecy, not in its disclosure.
However, a problem for owners lies in obtaining restitution and
possibly even retribution against those who would unfairly compete in the industry by misappropriating trade secrets.

A

NEW LOOK AT UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION
IN VIEW OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY

Unfair methods of competition involving misappropriation of
trade secrets have traditionally required a taking or copying of
Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 909
(1970).
16. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974).
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939) states:
Definition of trade secret. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it ....
A
trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. Generally it relates to the production of
goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for the production
of an article. It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to
other operations in the business ....
18. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970) states: "Every patent shall contain ...
a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen
years .... "
19. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) states: "The copyright secured by this title
shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication
... [and] . . . for the further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the
copyright office." Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a),
90 Stat. 2541 (1976) states: "Copyright in a work . . . subsists from
its creation and ... endures for a term consisting of the life of the
author and fifty years after the author's death."
20. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939) states:
Secrecy. The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. ...
[A] substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by
the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring
the information. An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible.
Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the
information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to
which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy
of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by
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tangible property. 21 Analog computers 2 2-which by their very
nature do not utilize software-and the hardware parts of digital
computers 23 constitute tangible property. Consequently, their
meet the traditional common law
misappropriation would easily
'24
"taking.
a
of
requirement
However, the digital computer requires the use of software.
This technological innovation 25 led to the creation of basic legal
problems for those who wanted to protect their software against
the unscrupulous by traditional tort and criminal law concepts.
Software as Property
The first and most basic problem facing owners was whether
or not software was indeed property. Because of its nature as
input in the form of holes in paper cards and magnetized areas
on magnetic tape, software was questioned initially in the courts
as to whether it was property capable of being taken in the traditional, legal sense. A reexamination of the basic concept of property as a tangible was required. The question was answered
affirmatively when the criminal law was viewed through the
26
magnifying glass of computer programs in Hancock v. State.
The defendant, a computer programmer employed by Texas
Instruments (TI) in Dallas, worked with approximately 100 secret programs that related to seismic and other geophysical applications. He printed out and photocopied fifty-nine of these programs, valued by his employer at two and one-half million
dollars, and attempted to sell them to Texaco Oil for five million
dollars. Texaco representatives alerted TI to the offer and they
him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
others.

21. See, e.g., People v. Dolbeer, 314 Cal. App. 2d 619, 620-21, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 573, 574-75 (1963); People v. Parker, 217 Cal. App. 2d 422, 425-26,
31 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719-20 (1963).
22. An analog computer system provides a continuous representa-

tion of a changing physical system. The output of an analog appears
as the operation of a printing press, flow control in an oil refinery,
synchronization of machinery in an industrial plant assembly line, or
the tracking of a guided missile.
23. A digital computer system makes use of "discrete" quantities

which are manipulated to generate the desired result or answer. The
output of a digital appears in the form of a mathematical or scientific
calculation or a stack of payroll checks. "Hardware" is a term used
in the trade for the assembly of disconnected and inoperative circuits
and apparatuses within the digital.
24. A "taking," as an element of the crime of larceny, has been
defined broadly to mean that one "will acquire dominion over the prop-

erty, enabling him to take actual custody or control thereof, and
amounting to a trespass or its equivalent." 50 Am.JUR. 2d Larceny
§ 10 (1970)

(footnotes omitted).

25. The first commercial use of software-programmed digital com-

puters began about 1953.
26. 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
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jointly hired an investigator who, upon being shown the programs by the defendant's accomplice, confiscated the photocopies
and turned them over to the state prosecutor in Dallas. Criminal
charges for theft of property worth more than fifty dollars were
brought. Defendant contended that the programs were not "corporeal personal property" 27 within the meaning of the state penal
code, that if the programs were property they were valueless in
Dallas because there was no market for them, and that, if the
programs were valuable property, he had stolen at most thirtyfive dollars worth of tangible paper.
These defenses were unavailing and defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas found that
the computer programs were property subject to theft because
the state statute enumerated "all writings of every description,
provided such property possess any ascertainable value. ' 28 The
court also found that, although the programs were used in Dallas
only by TI employees, they had a market value in excess of fifty
dollars because they were used for a price by others, albeit out29
side Dallas.
The defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court was denied, and on appeal to the fifth circuit, the appellate court felt bound by the statutory interpretation of the state court that the papers containing the photocopied
computer programs were corporeal property.3 0 Consequently,
the appellate court affirmed the denial of the request for a writ
of habeas corpus on the grounds that the state law, as so con3
strued, did not violate due process. '
Although the case was decided on the basis of a liberal interpretation of a state statute, the Hancock opinions show a clear
willingness to extend the definition of property to include a valuable intangible, such as a computer program.
Intangible Property Capable of Being Taken
A second basic problem confronting those who wished to protect their software by traditional tort and criminal law concepts
was whether or not software, as intangible property, was capable
32
of being "taken." It appears that, after the Hancock cases
cleared the hurdle of finding that software was property, the
decision-makers concluded sub silentio that software-like any
27. Id. at 908.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 910-11.
30. Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967).
31. Id. at 553.

32. See notes 26 & 30 supra.

Computer Software

1977]

other property-was indeed capable of being taken.3 3 Because
the Hancock cases did not analyze the issue of whether or not
34
there was a taking in the traditional legal sense by trespass
and asportation, 35 the issue is still wide open for a detailed analysis that may result in a contrary conclusion. Clearly, if any court
is to decide that software can be the subject of trespass and asportation, it must do so by making a constructive finding to include
situations where a disloyal person enters upon the employer's
premises and carries off valuable software information in his
mind.36
In any event, unsatisfied with this singular legal victory in
the Hancock cases, representatives of the computer industry have
actively petitioned state legislatures for enactment of broadly
worded criminal laws specifically punishing those who would
3 7
take intangible property such as computer programs.
Although a "taking" is often broadly defined in criminal statutes,3 8 the concomitant strict construction of penal codes by the
courts may not provide a sufficient deterrent effect in some
future cases, and consequently it may be necessary to pursue
money damages in a tort action against any apprehended, solvent 39 culprit-individual, corporate, or otherwise-with resort
to the broader concept in the Restatement of a taking as any "improper means of discovery." 40
33. Although not specifically discussed, this issue was obviously resolved affirmatively.
34. 50 AM.

JUR.

2d Larceny § 14 (1970)

(footnotes omitted) states:

A rule universally recognized, in the absence of any statute to
the contrary, although characterized by some elasticity of interpretation in certain situations, is that there must be a trespass in the
taking of another's goods in order to constitute larceny-a trespass
to the possessionof the owner, either actual or constructive. Without this trespass there can be no larceny.
35. 50 AM. JUR. 2d Larceny § 15 (1970) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted) states:
Both at common law and under statutes declaratory thereof,
the felonious taking which is an essential element of larceny must
be followed by such an asportation or carrying away as to supersede the possession of the owner for an appreciable time.

Unless

otherwise provided by statute, the crime is not complete until there

has been an asportation, although the offender had the power to
carry the property away. Furthermore,property that is not subject

to asportationcannot be stolen.
36. See text accompanying notes 45-57 infra.
37. See, e.g., Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 909, 947-48 (1970) for a brief discussion of the industry's
success in the most populous state, California.
38. See note 24 supra.
39. Although solvency is not usually a characteristic of the criminal
milieu, it may sometimes be an attribute of those sophisticated enough

to engage in the piratical activity under discussion.
40. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment f (1939) states:
Improper means of discovery. The discovery of another's trade
secret by improper means subjects the actor to liability independently of the harm to the interest in the secret ....

Examples of

such means are fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure,
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THE PRIME METHOD OF UNFAIR COMPETITION IN THE COMPUTER

INDUSTRY-MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS

The most common method of unfair competition in the computer industry is the misappropriation of trade secrets. Liability
for this type of interference with business relations is expounded
in the Restatement of Torts section 75741 which has been noted as
"widely relied upon" by the Supreme Court.42 Damages will be

levied by state courts in tort cases whenever trade secrets are
discovered by improper means. 43 Although incapable of precise
definitions, improper means of discovery do include "means
which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial
morality and reasonable conduct. '44 However, known incidences
of such improper means are not too numerous. Perhaps this is
so because the intellectual sophistication of those involved in such
activity and the nature of the offense as a nonviolent, inconspicuous commission have combined to prevent widespread detection.
On the other hand, the sparsity of cases may be due to a level
of honesty among those in the industry that is higher than that
of the general population. In either event, the quarter century
since the commercial advent of computer technology has not been
long enough to produce abundant examples of improper means.
Nevertheless, there are some cases that merit attention.
The Disloyal Employee

Although "equity has no power to compel a man who
tapping of telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage. A
complete catalogue of improper means is not possible. In general
they are means which fall below the generally accepted standards
of commercial morality and reasonable conduct.
41. Liability for Disclosure or Use of Another's Trade Secret-General Principle.
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a
privilege to do so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed
in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the
facts that it was a secret and that the third person discovered
it by improper means or that the third person's disclosure of
it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a
secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 757 (1939).
42. In ruling that state laws for the protection of trade secrets are
not preempted by the federal patent law, the Supreme Court cited this
Restatement section in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
474-76 (1974).
43. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939) states: "One who, for the
purpose of advancing a rival business interest, procures by improper
means information about another's business is liable to the other for
the harm caused by his possession, disclosure or use of the information."
44. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment f (1939), supra note
39.
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changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory, ' 45 this
maxim applies only as long as there is no breach of confidence
by the former employee. However, a breach may occur in several
ways. An employee may be disloyal at heart and commit larceny
of tangible computer hardware by his own hand.
In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc.,46 Sperry Rand
began research and development in 1954 on a process for making
magnetic memory cores for use in computers. By 1962, commercial production began at its UNIVAC plant in suburban Philadelphia. During the development, Sperry Rand had its project
employees sign a confidential agreement not to disclose any trade
secrets or other proprietary information learned during the
course of the employment. In late 1966 and early 1967, officers
of a small competitor, Pentronix, met with and offered three of
Sperry Rand's top employees a higher salary and a profit-sharing
plan that amounted to approximately four times their present
salary. The trio accepted Pentronix's offer and tendered their
resignations to Sperry Rand. Before leaving, however, they
photocopied 668 pages of progress and technical reports and 420
pages of engineering bulletins. They also took a certain circuit
diagram design and a set of model cores. Finally, other employees observed them toting out briefcases and cardboard boxes full
of undetermined documents. Five months after the resignations
were effective, Pentronix began commercial sales of sixteen different magnetic memory cores substantially identical to those
cores that Sperry Rand had taken eight years to develop. Sperry
Rand sued the three former employees for breach of contract and
Pentronix for unfair competition. Citing the Restatement of Torts
section 757,47 the court found that the former employees had misappropriated trade secrets, that the competitor was engaging in
a conspiracy with the individual defendants, and that, as a result
thereof, Sperry Rand had been irreparably harmed. A permanent injunction was issued against Pentronix's manufacture of
the cores and damages for lost profits were awarded to Sperry
Rand.
An employee may also be disloyal at heart and commit larceny of intangible computer technology by carrying out trade
secret information in his mind. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein,48 Rothlein approached Sperry Rand in 1953 about going into
the business of manufacturing semiconductors for use in computers. Sperry Rand agreed and hired Rothlein to head a re45. Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715,
717, 132 N.Y.S. 37, 39 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
46. 311 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
47. Id. at 913.

48. 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
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search and development division on Long Island, New York. In
1956, the division was moved to Norwalk, Connecticut, and commercial production began. In the meantime, Rothlein, as did
each new employee, signed an agreement not to divulge any trade
secret to any unauthorized person during or after his term of
employment.
Early in 1959, Sperry Rand reorganized the semiconductor
division and appointed Sittner as Rothlein's superior. Because
this appointment was made without prior consultation with
Rothlein, and because of other difficulties with Sperry Rand's
management over equipment and production performance, Rothlein decided to form his own company, National Semiconductor
Corporation. For another five months, Rothlein worked for
Sperry Rand while he obtained financial backing and recruited
other Sperry Rand employees for the new firm. After all arrangements were completed for the establishment of National
Semiconductor, Rothlein and his recruits resigned en masse from
Sperry Rand and the new company went into direct competition,
severely cutting into Sperry Rand's share of the market.
One month after the resignations,4" Sperry Rand sued Rothlein and seven of the twenty-seven other former employees who
went to work for National Semiconductor, charging breach of
contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. The court found
that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to their
former employer by suppressing corporate opportunities for their
own advantage, inducing fellow employees to quit in order to
staff their own operation, and taking and using trade secrets
learned while in Sperry Rand's employ for the purpose of furthering National Semiconductor's business; all in violation of
their employment contracts. Citing the Restatement of Torts
section 757,50 the court also found that the defendants had physically taken a copy of specifications for a silicon alloy junction
transistor, various drawings, and other confidential documents.
The defendants vigorously contested this point. The court's
statement was most interesting on the issue of mental misappropriation:
The defendants claim that the drawings used by their company,

National Semiconductor Corporation, most of which were the
same as and interchangeable with Sperry's drawings, were constructed, not by copying from Sperry's, but from memory. It

may be and if so, it was a remarkable display of memory, for
numerous measurements were in thousandths of an inch. But it
does not matter whether a copy of a Sperry drawing came out
49. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1961).
50. 241 F. Supp. at 560-62,
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in a defendant's hand or in his head. His duty of fidelity to his
employer remains the same. 51
Also, regarding employees, an employer must guard against
not only the disloyal at heart but also those vulnerable to bribery
and coercion through threats of harm by third parties or through
blackmail because of an employee's present or past matters of personal sensitivity. Finally, simply because an employer has information that it regards as a trade secret is no assurance that
a court will hold a disloyal employee accountable for any unauthorized use of such information after terminating his or her employment. An employer must take reasonable safeguards to
maintain the confidentiality of a trade secret. Information cannot be a trade secret one day for purposes of muting an employee
and not be a trade secret another day for purposes of obtaining
new business. Confidentiality must be maintained at all times.
Although it is not absolutely necessary to have employment
agreements prohibiting disclosure of confidential information as
in the two Sperry Rand cases, 52 an employer should be advised
to have such written agreements. A failure to safeguard purported trade secrets and to have nondisclosure employment
agreements can have disastrous consequences on an employer's
business.
In Republic Systems & Programming, Inc. v. Computer
Assistance, Inc.,53 a computer software business had a branch office managed by Vignola who, like the rest of its employees, had
no written employment contract. Disenchanted with financial
conditions and supervision by the home office, Vignola consulted
his top assistants and his lawyer about forming his own company
and discussed subsequent merger plans with his employer's chief
competitor. As soon as the incorporation papers of the new company were prepared, Vignola mailed a letter of resignation to
the home office. The resignation, sent on a Friday, was to be
effective immediately. During the weekend Vignola contacted
his former co-workers and offered them jobs with his new company at slightly higher salaries than they were being paid at that
time. When the employer's branch office opened Monday morning, only five of the twenty-five employees arrived. On that
Monday, Vignola started soliciting business from his former employer's customers, and most switched their business to him.
Four days after receiving Vignola's letter of resignation in
the mail, the former employer sued Vignola for breach of fiduciary duty and for misappropriation of trade secrets, i.e., customer
51. Id. at 563.

52. See notes 46 & 48 supra.
53. 322 F. Supp. 619 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 440 F.2d 996

(2d Cir. 1971).
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lists. The district court dismissed the employer's action. The
court ruled that the fiduciary duty ended when the employment
ended and that, since there was no written contract between the
parties, each employee was "entitled to terminate the employ'54
ment relationship at will at any time with or without cause.
Citing the Restatement of Torts section 757, comment b,-55 the
court also ruled that customer lists did not qualify as trade secrets because many of the clients were openly listed in advertising brochures as "representative clients" and "efforts to keep
the names of the remainder secret were meager at best." 56 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's opinion with one
judge dissenting. 7
Customers
Secrecy in the industry is ordinarily maintained by software
owners through nondisclosure clauses in leases with customers
for the computer programs.58 These written agreements allow
owners to seek money damages in court through breach of contract actions for any unauthorized disclosures made by lessees
of the trade secret.
For example, in Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc.,5 9 a manufacturer sold small general-purpose digital

computers. Ordinarily, the logic or design drawings of the
machine were not included in the sale; however, if a customer
wanted to make its own repairs rather than wait for the manufacturer's maintenance personnel to do so, the drawings would
be made available at no extra cost upon signing an agreement
not to disclose them to third parties. All drawings were marked
with a legend that they were proprietary information and not
to be used for manufacturing purposes. One customer sold
everything, including the design drawings, to one of the competitors of the computer manufacturer. The competitor used the
drawings as the basic design for a new model.
The manufacturer sought a preliminary injunction against
the use of its drawings and the competitor filed a motion for
54.
55.
56.
57.

322 F. Supp. at 625-26.
Id. at 628. See note 19 supra.
322 F. Supp. at 628.
440 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1971).

58. Software is usually not sold by its owners because control over

its subsequent use is necessarily lost by a sale. To attempt to maintain
control of use after sale would be a violation of Sherman Antitrust Act
§ 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended by Act of December 21, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708, as an unreasonable restraint on commercial trade. Only by retaining title to the software may an owner
condition its continuing use by a lessee on perpetual nondisclosure to

third parties.
59. 297 A.2d 433 (Del. Ch. 1971), aff'd 297 A.2d 437 (Del. S. Ct. 1972).

1977]

Computer Software

summary judgment. The state chancery court denied both motions.60 Apparently, because the manufacturer sold the computer, making it generally available to the public for reverse engineering purposes, the court denied the motion for a preliminary
injunction. The court considered the manufacturer entitled to
an injunction only for that period of time determined to be necessary for the competitor to reverse engineer the computer without
the drawings. Since the term of the injunction during the court
proceedings might extend beyond that period needed for successful reverse engineering, the court decided not to grant any injunction. However, because the manufacturer had taken some precautions to protect the design drawings as trade secrets, the court
denied the competitor's motion for summary judgment. The conclusion was that the adequacy of the precautions was a factual
dispute preventing summary judgment. Ten months later, the
state supreme court affirmed the chancery court, citing the
Restatement of Torts section 757.1
Also, an owner must guard against not only those customers
who obtain the trade secret legally and later sell it for their own
monetary gain when the opportunity comes, but also customers
who approach the owner and initially misrepresent their intentions for the sole purpose of obtaining the trade secret to sell or
otherwise dispose of it for their own gain. Such activity suggests
criminal acts of deceit and taking property under false pretenses.
Competitors
In protecting its trade secrets, a software owner should design safeguards mainly against discovery by direct competitors.
However, as indicated above, those safeguards can be breached
by a competitor via the instrumentality of employees and customers. In an industry where high intellect and low capital are the
only requirements to enter the marketplace, it is no surprise that
the competition is fierce and occasionally sinks to the most unscrupulous level. The unfair methods of competition practiced
in the software industry by competitors today have taken an interesting twist from those of unfair competition in the traditional
sense. In the latter type of practices, a competitor sold its own
goods as those of another--commonly known as "palming off."
Today in the software industry, a competitor, as a result of
a misappropriation of a trade secret, sells or leases another's
goods or information as its own. However, since most software
arrangements are leases and most of these are made in confidence, it is difficult for one to learn when a competitor has mis60. 297 A.2d at 436.
61. Id. at 439.
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appropriated one's trade secrets. This is true even if both approach the same prospective customer. Unless the customer has
the highest moral standards, 62 the customer will usually stand
mute when the same computer program at substantially different
prices is offered confidentially by two competitors, because it is
in the financial interest of the customer to remain silent land accept the lower offer.
Although there is a constant fear in the software industry
about espionage, conspiracies, burglaries, malicious destruction of
property, and other types of sabotage by competitors, the number
of cases exposed is far less than one would expect for an industry that fluctuates so widely at times in its number of market
participants. However, there is one leading case that is significant because of the amount of money involved. The owner survived simply because it was big enough to absorb the losses.
In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 63 Telex sued IBM for violating
the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing the market6 4 in plug
compatible peripheral products attachable to central processing
units for IBM computers. IBM counterclaimed for misappropriation of trade secrets relating to the pertinent technology. In
the manufacture of plug compatible peripheral products, IBM
had about thirty-five percent of the market65 and earned about
1.14 billion dollars in 1970.66 All its combined competitors earned
slightly less that 100 million dollars. 67 About this time, one competitor in this computer products sub-market, Telex, embarked
upon a systemic plan to lure away key employees of IBM. In
1970, only one of its fifty engineers had worked for IBM but,
by 1973, 152 of its 1,929 employees were ex-IBM personnel.6 8 The
recruits were offered substantially higher salaries, stock options,
and bonuses, in one case up to one-half million dollars 9 and were
encouraged to take out all the confidential information and trade
secrets they could before they left IBM's employment. As a
result of this piratical activity, Telex was able to reduce significantly its development time on many projects, in one case from
five to one and one-half years. 70 Also, it was able to save signi62. Recall that in Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App.
1966), supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text, the customer, Texaco
Oil, reported to TI an offer by Hancock to sell the same program for
five million dollars that TI said was worth only two and one-half million dollars. Query: Would the case have come to light if the offer by
Hancock to sell was for one and one-quarter million dollars or less?
63. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
64. This issue in the case will not be discussed because it is irrelevant to the subject matter of this article.
65. 510 F.2d at 899.
66. Id. at 900.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 910.

69. Id. at 911.
70. Id.
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ficantly on costs, as much as ten million dollars on the same pro71
ject and seven and one-half million dollars on another project.
On the counterclaim, the trial court awarded 20.9 million dollars
actual damages and assessed one million dollars punitive damages.7 2 The court of appeals affirmed the decision but reduced
the amount of actual damages to seventeen and one-half million
73
dollars.
Joint Venturers
A common practice, an outgrowth of the highly competitive
nature of the computer software industry, is the joint venture
in which several small competitors pool resources and assist each
other in carrying out their separate services. However, when one
company gets desperate, financially or otherwise, as sometimes
happens, there is a falling out between the parties. Such disagreements often lead persons to commit acts which they would not
have considered in better times and, as has been the case from
the time of Caesar, a stab in the back has been known to be
delivered by a former friendly hand. Consider the following two
cases.
In Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc.,7 4 two financially struggling software development companies entered into
a technical exchange agreement in 1967. After differences arose
between the parties, the agreement was prematurely terminated
in 1970. The agreement had provided that neither party could
disclose the exchanged trade secrets to third parties without prior
written consent of the other for a period of twenty-four months
after its expiration. However, nine months after the termination,
Computer Complex announced that it was selling out substantially all of its assets to a larger competitor of Com-Share. The
former joint venturer sued for an injunction against the sale of
its exchanged trade secrets. The defendant contended that the
duty not to disclose ended when the agreement was terminated
by mutual consent and that the injunction would be an idle gesture because the transfer of the software trade secrets had begun
and "the omelet cannot be unscrambled. ' 75 The court was "not
71. Id.
72. Id. at 928.
73. Id. at 933. It was learned from the lead counsel for IBM that
his client never collected a penny on the judgment. After Telex filed
documents with the Securities & Exchange Commission stating that it
would be unable to pay, the parties entered into an overall settlement
whereby IBM gave up the right to pursue collection. Letter from
Thomas D. Barr, Esquire to the author (September 28, 1976). Certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed after the settlement
agreement was finalized. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
74. 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d
1341 (6th Cir. 1972).

75. 338 F. Supp. at 1239.
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persuaded that modern technology has withered the strong right
'
and ruled that the disposition of the assets
arm of equity"76
would unjustly enrich the defendant at the expense of ComShare. A preliminary injunction was issued and affirmed by the
court of appeals.
A more complicated fact situation involving joint venturers
and a disloyal employee arose in University Computing Co. v.
Lykes-Youngstown Corp.77 In 1969, a small computer service

company, University Computing Co. (hereinafter UCC), and a
large holding company, Lykes-Youngstown Corp. (hereinafter
LYC), entered into a joint venture agreement whereby a new company, Lykes/UCC, was formed to open new markets for computer systems. UCC was to provide management and LYC was
to post capital. A UCC officer, Shinn, became president of
Lykes/UCC, but advised LYC that, if it formed its own whollyowned subsidiary, chances for commercial success would be substantially the same but at a better rate of return on its capital.
Consequently, LYC terminated the joint venture agreement after
only two months existence and established a subsidiary, LykesYoungstown Computer Services Corp. (hereinafter LYCSC),
with Shinn as its president. Shortly thereafter, LYCSC bribed
an employee of a UCC customer in order to steal the computer
tapes and materials incident to a computerized retail inventory
control system leased by UCC subject to a restrictive use agreement. LYCSC then began marketing the system in direct
competition with UCC. UCC sued LYC, LYCSC, and Shinn for
misappropriation of the computerized system. Citing the Restatement of Torts section 757,78 the court of appeals affirmed
the jury verdict for UCC that the computerized system was a
trade secret wrongfully appropriated by the three co-defendants.

79

SUGGESTIONS FOR PROTECTING COMPUTER SOFTWARE AGAINST
METHODS OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

Although there is no assured way to protect one's computer
software against a determined enemy, a number of routine security precautions should substantially decrease the chance of
inadvertent damage or losses and increase the likelihood of detection and apprehension of any ill-meaning culprits.
First, access to the computer and its material storage areas
should be well controlled. Casually parading business visitors
76. Id.
77. 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. Id. at 534.

79. Id. at 535.
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and members of the general public on good will tours may result
in the loss of a seemingly inconspicuous piece of hardware or
software as a surreptiously taken souvenir. s0 Duplicate or even
triplicate files of all card decks, tapes, and other tangible material
should be maintained in separate storage areas, preferably remotely located from each other in individual fireproof safes or
vaults. 8 1 These are inadvertent losses that may be easily avoided
by simple safety measures.
It is more difficult to protect one's computer software against
deliberate abuse. However, a number of safeguards may be invoked particularly directed toward monitoring the activities of
employees who, as was pointed out above, are the major perpetrators of trade secret misappropriations. The safeguarding process should begin before the potential employee is hired by conducting an extensive screening of the person's background.
Nothing less than a check with the FBI for past criminal activity
may be satisfactory. At the moment of hiring, an employment
contract with a clause forbidding the disclosure of trade secrets
should be presented for the prospective employee's signature. The
clause should be carefully and forcefully explained in order to
impress upon the person the seriousness of any violation and the
resulting civil and criminal penalties. After the employee is
hired, one way to keep him or her honest is to pay a high salary
with generous bonuses and merit raises for good work. Since
most employees that have become disloyal did so for more money, this practice, although applicable to any industry, takes on
added significance in the computer field where the detection of
misappropriation of trade secrets is quite difficult.
It is advisable that a password be developed for allowing direct access to the computer by only those employees who need
to have such access. This password should be changed periodically so that former employees who no longer need access cannot
obtain it at their pleasure or relay an effective password to the
unscrupulous. A rewards policy for any employee who reports
suspicious 'activity or unusual operating procedures by a co-employee that turns out to be justified creates an effective internal
system of checks and balances. Finally, a periodic and unannounced random accounting and/or run of computer software
by selected employees would also serve 'as an internal security
procedure.
Some employees may object to such strict security measures
on grounds that they create a work atmosphere of fear and sus80. Allen, Danger ahead! Safeguard your computer, 46 HARV. Bus.
Rsv. 97, 100 (1968).
81. Id. at 100-01.
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picion. The natural answer to the objection is that only employees who have anything to fear are those who have something
to hide. After all, the employer is in a high risk business and
must be vigilant with such an intangible as computer software.
Likewise, the employer's attorney must not be ignorant of the
pitfalls facing the client before and during its venture into the
dark and treacherous business world of computer software technology.

